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PROSPECTS F'OR TIIE
THE MEDW
MANAGEMENT OT' NIGERIA'S E](TERNAL DEBT
By DR. PAIIL A. OGWI
Gouerrar,

kntal

Bo:nk oJ

and the efforts made so far to
address it. It witl also assess
the debt situation in ttre medium-term in the light of current

economic development, including the prospects for its

DR. PAI'L A" OGWUMA, OtrR,
&rdral Bank of Ntgerto, lagos.

Gorrernor,

fshould like to begin by ex-

my

deep
appreciation to the Chamber
for inviting me as the guest
speaker at this annual lun-

lpressing

effective management and the
policy implications. Finally, I
intend not only to sensitizeyou
on the magnitude of the problern, but also to indcate in what
ways your members could support our efforts to deal with the
debt overhang.

3.

MAT OFR,

Nlgerla lagos.

portion of debt service to the
exports ofgoods and services islower than or equal to lO per
cent, a debt problem does not
arise. As the ratio grows to about
20 per cent, the tolerable limit
of debt service is approached,
whilebeyond 2O percent a debt
crisis wouldset in. This is why
countries try to ltmit their debt
service ratio to between 1O and
2O per cent through appropri-

ate debt

management

strategies.

Irtmestartthisdiscussion
by stating some facts which OVERVIEW OF. NIGERIA'S
cheon. I also consider it a may be obvious but which, EXTERNAL DEBT PROBLDM
privilege for me to have been nevertheless, need recapitula- 4. Nigeria's current external
allowed to select the subJect of tion in order to put the subject debt problem can be appraised
my address. After careful con- ln proper perspective. External from the perspectives of the
sideration, I have decided to debts arise. from loanl and debt stock and debt service
speak on the important subJ ect credit procurred by the resi- payment obligations, both of
of managing Nigeria's orternal dents of a country from the rest which have assumed alarming
debt. Speciftcally, I wish to dwell

on the topic, *The MediumTerm Prospects for the
Management of Nigeria's External Debf.

2. As you are all

aware,
Nigeria's external debt burden
has constituted a maJor con-

straint

on

economic

performance in recent years and
an objective appraisal indicates

a continuation of tkris trend

unless concrete remedial measures are adopted to minimise
the constraints. The subject is
certainly topical and worthy of
discussion in a business forum
such as this. The address will
highlight the antecedents to
Nigeria's current debt problem
An Address
Lagos.
2

of the world intended to bridge
the savings/investment gap.
When such resources'are productively deployed, they do not
constltute a problem or a drain
on future resources. In order to

ensure sustainability of debt
servlcing, borrowing countries
need to adopt efficient external
debt management strategies
which entail carefully planned
schedules of external debt acquisition, deployment and
retirement. An external debt
problem usually exists when
more and more of current re-

proportions in the last ten years.
It is quite instructive to note
that the country's debt stock

just some US$S. 5 billion in
1980. However, this has grown

was

by leaps and bounds to stand
at $29.a billion at the end of
December" 1994. In the same
vein, the deb t service pa5rments
have risen substantially from a
mere 0.8 per cent of export
earnings in 198O to 4O.9 per
cent in 1994.
5. The genesis of Nigeria's
debt problem can be traced to
1978 when loans worth more
than $f .8 billionwere obtained

sources are deployed to service
loans. It is internationally ac- from the Euromarket. This
cepted that when the debt changed the character of
service ratio, that is, the pro- Nigeria's debt with the struc-

kliuerd. onthe Occasion oJthe Aru:rual l,uncheon oJ the FYanco-Nigerian Chamber

oJ Commerce and.

Industry,
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tural strtft from eoncesslonal accounUng for 62.2,7.1 and nech to otrr ecpnomic grou/th
debts to medlum term lnter- 30.7 per cent of the total, re- When the scheduled debt
naflond capital market loans specfirely.
commltmerrts were duly serwlth touglrer repa5rment ter:ms.
Over the years, thls patterr of
contracttng new loans for development pu4roses continued,
so thatby l9&3, the debt stock
had rtsen to $r 1.9 billi.on. But
of more tmpprtance ls the fact
that the funds that were borrowed to flnance dwelopment
proJects were diverted to ffnanclng deflctts in later years,

as oll enport revenues fell

sharply and government rather
than embarkf ng on ocperrdittrre
slicing, chose to use o<ternal
borrowingto flnance the gap. A
large proportion of the debt was
not only tn the form of medium-

term loans contracted at

7.

Thedebtstochandthedebt

resources was deployed to
servicing past consumpUon
tors. These lnclude the wtth llttle left for current lnstmctural shlft ln the compo- vestment. As a result, the rate
siflon of outstandtng debts to of economtcgfowth and develinternaUonal capttal rnarket opment had been impatred and
(ICM) in the late 1970's and the prwision of social welfare
also to short term debts as servlces compromlsed. The inagatnst multtlateral/btlateral ability to service the debts gs
sources whlch are usually more and when due has provoked
concessional. On tnsiltutional ttre hostility of external credlor creditor basls, the relatively tors leadtng to the low credit
large share of Parls Club debts rating of the countryr. This has
vls-a-vls the london Club debt also dlscouragd the inflow of
Xn Nlgeria's outstandlng debt fore{gn capital and created a
constituted another problem. wide Ilnanctng gap Ir the balThis ls because re-schedullng ance of payments osrtng to
termsunderthe Paris Club are errceptional ffnandng ttems tn
dg[ter and more strlngent ttrarr respect of debt service paythce of the london Club. The ments whtch urcre deferred. T?re
deployrnent of strort-terrn fu nds low level of foreign ercctrange
tnto long-term proJect flnanc- recetpts and the triglr proporfng constltuted another flon devoted to debt s€rvtce
xternal debt problern, whlle payments have reduced the
upurard movements ln tnter- level of domesfic economic acnational tnterest and exchange tlvltles, with serious

floatlng lnterest rates, but also
thetr maturtties were heavil5l
concentrated at pertods that
cotnclded wlth dwlndltng oil
_revenues. Consequently, debt
serrrice obfige{on ln 1984 was
about 2@ per cent of the stock
of available errternal reservis
and over 25 per cent of ocport rates hane putupmmrd press une
re\renue.
on the debt stock.
6. The accumulated arrears 8. Apart from the lncrea$ng
of 1982 to 1983 which were erdernal debt service raflo, oth€r
reconciled and accepted as indicators of external debt
public debt some years later problem showed deteriorating
contributed to ttre exacerbation trends. For lnstance, the ratio
of the debt problem as ttre debt of external debt serwtce to e:<stock rose to $27.5 billion in temal debt/export ratio has
f 992 and debt service ratio also consistently exceeded 1OO per
increased further to 65.4 per cent since 1982. While actual
cent. In addition, because the debt service ratio exceeded 2O
debts were denominated in Bu- per cent (the tolerable limit)
ropean and Japanese between 1984 and 1992 and
currencies which tended to recorded lower levels in 1993
appreciate against the dollar, and 1994, the scheduled debt
theirvalues indollar terms also service ratio ranged between
increased. Nigeria's external 4O.9 and 65.4 per cen+. in the
debt outstanding at the end of period 1990 - 1994.
1994 comprised the debt owed 9. Itis needless to emphasise
to the Paris and London clubs that the external debt profile
and other categories ofcreditors has constituted a majorbotfleI

vlced, a large portron of current

servlce raUo havecontlnued to
lncrease for a number of fac-

oonsequences for domestlc ca-

paclty uttlization

and

producflon. hr the absence of
appreciable economic growth,
the debt burden has conflnued
to increase while ttre debt service capacity has continued to
decline, thus exacerbating the
vicious circle of external debt.
MAI{AGEMENT OT THE
EXTERNAL DEBT SO FAR
10. Let me recapitulate some
of the actions taken so far to

address the external debt
problem. With the re-emergence
of trade arrears in 1982, con-

certed efforts were made
towards ascertaining the magnitude of such arrears. Having
reasonably known the magnitude, the first and second
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refinancing agreements for Club rescheduling arrange- inJanuary 1991, stretched out
tracle debts worth $2,112.1 ment was achieved in January the repayment period of due
million were concluded in 1983, f992, when Nigeria secured a debts on terms applicable to
while the third agreement in- buy-back deal. Under the medium income and heavily
volving the issuance of agreement, about 62 per cent debt-distressed countries. The

'

promissory notes commenced
in November, 1984. By 1986,
debts involved in the two refinancing agreements had been
fully liquidated. Meanwhile, the
limit of extemal debt servicing
has been peggecl at 30 per cent
since 1983 in order to make
more resources available for

servicing the

domestic

economy.
I 1. Nigeriaforgedaheadinthe
quest to reduce its debtburden
ln respect of medium/ long- term
debts through various restructuring schemes, including debt

-rescheduling, debt buy-back
and debt conversion. The
original terms on which the
promissory notes were issued
under the third refinancing
agreement were reviewed as a

of the debt was bought back at
4O cents for one dollar while
the remaining 38 percent was

backed by US Treasury

collateralized par bonds maturing after 3O years.
13. However, the Paris Club
debts that are owed to official
creditors have continued to be
a source of concern. The Paris
Club of official creditors have
so far extended some rescheduling concessions to Nigeria

Anotber important initlatiae taken to reduce
Nfgeria's debt burd.en
u)as tbe introduction of
tbe Debt Conaersion
Programme (DCP) in

, result of the difficulties enI countered by Nigeria in fullilling
I th. terns. Under the original
I agfeement, a maturity period
I of sixyears was set for the$4.8
I biUion worth of debts with a
and
I Srace period of 2t /, years
per
interest
rate
of
I
cent
an
I
of the rates
I above the average
leading
internaby
I euoted the
I tional banks. In the reviewed
i terms. the repayment period
I

I

1988, Tbe sclteme u)as
meant to conaert debts
into equity inuestment in
Nigeria. Under tbe DCP,
appl:ications uortl $5.4
bllllon b aae b een recelaed
slnce 1988, uttb approaals in principle of $2.6
bilkon and actual conwas extended to 22 years with aersiotts oJf $81 5.1
an overall return of 5 per cent million.
per annum.
12. Negotiations torestructure
the London Club debts worth

which have generally failed to
the root of the debt
$5.8 billion commenced in address
problem. Under the December
1986. while the agreement was
1986 and March 1989 agreesigned on November 23, 1987.
ments, interest payments that
Out of the-$S.A billion restrucfell due within a period of 15
tured, $Z,A billion was months
were consolidated and
reftnanced while $3.O billion
was reschedtiled" A major rescheduled, an operation that
breakthrough in the London effectively caplialised the interest payments. A third effort
4'

non-application of the Toronto
and Trinidad Terms as well as
the Poland/Erypt concessions
and the debt write-off applicable to the poorest countries,
made it impossible for real benefits to accrue to Nigeria from
the various rescheduling exercises with the Paris Club. The
short consolidation period and
non-accepta^rce of multi-year
rescheduling and debt writeoffs are major problems that
Nigeria has been contending
with.
14. Another important initiative taken to reduce Nigeria's
debt burden was the introduction of the Debt Conversion
Programme (DCP)in 1988. The
scheme was meant to convert
debts into equity investment in
Nigeria. Under the DCP, applications worth $5.4 bi[ion have
been received since 1988, with
approvals in principle of $2.6
billion and actual conversions
of $8I5.1 million. Although
some debts have been extinguished under the scheme. Uee
total amount is rather small
when compared to the stock of
outstanding debts. Be that as it
may, the DCP still remains a
veritable vehicle for channelling foreign investments into
the economy and attracting
back flight capital provided the
general economic environment
gradually improves.
15. Witht all the rescheduling
efforts and thevarious schemes
aimed at reducing Nigeria's external debt burden, the
outstandingdebt stockremains,
high. The debt stock declinecl
from $33.4 billion in 199I to

i

I
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in f992 as a re- transparent before giving ap- ca.rious, if o<port revenues result of the debt buy-back proval to the country's maitr at the current level. In

$Zz.S btllion

arrangemerrt with the london programme. Unfll a MediumClub. With further capitaliza- Term Economic Restructuring
fion of interest payments by Programme is agreed between
the Paris Club, the debt stock Nigeria and the two institutncreased to $28.7 and $29.4 tlons, tl:e Paris Club might
btllion in f993 and 1994, re- continue to ignore debt respecfively.
structuring moves by Nigeria.
16. I should point out that Ni- As we all know, the Paris Club
gerta has achtetred remarkable countries are also powerful
success Xr its rescheduling merrbers of the BrettonWoods
agreements with the london Institutions. As of today,
Club. The problem remains the therefore, the outstanding isParis Club debt that accounts sues in resolving the debt crisis
for the bulk of Nigerta's out- faclng Nlgeria tnclude an ac-

standing debt stock. The

ceptable

additlon, because a large portion of Nigeria s debt is in the
form of medium-term loans with
floating interest rates and a

heavy concentration of
maturities, bunching of payments obligations will occur.
Consequently., deferment in
debt senrice payments which

has characterized the management of Nigeria's external debt
service since f982 might per-

sist. Sueh deferments have'
been princip ally responsible for

Medium-Term the financing gaps tn Nigeria's
balance of payments, leading
Prograrrrne for Nigeria, with- to unsustainable current acsoltdation perlod and out which Nlgeria's debt with count position and lncreased
slnsle-yezrr rescheduling ar- the Paris Club cannot be re- pressure on t}re er<ternal secnon-rescheduling clause for its
tnterest pa5rments, short con-

Economic Restructuring

rangemerrt malce tlle Faris Club

stmcfured, and tlre acceptanoe
of Ntgertas stahrs as a low inooilne countr5r eligble for IMFs
ortended and enhanoed ESAF
and ry exbnsion the Parls
Club's debt reductron opfurrs
duced and debt servict4g fu the poorest debt distrcsod
obligafions reducd to the tol- oountries.
erable levcl of 2O per cent if not
tlre more acoeptable lerd of f O ASSHEXIT (FilICTCRIA'S
per cerrt The Parls Club dcbts ETTIf, f ALIEE,r Stfl IAII(f,I

terms unduly burdensome. If
the Paris CIub were to accept
terms sirnllar to tlre l.ondon
Club's, Nigerias d€bts would
have been substantiall5r re-

harrcbmam4jorhurdbin IlfaEErErl[Irr-Irfr
the managernent of tbe NigF f8. In asscssiqg Nigerfa's exrian emnom5r not crly because
of the sire but also bmuse of
the irrfluerroe of the Club in-the
lnternational eonom5r- The
Paris Club inststs that Nigeria
must be gFrrrr.a 'clean bll of
health- ty the International
Monetar5r Ffmd (IIi[F) and the
World Bankbefore it can errter
itlrto further resctreduling negptiations with her.
17. The turc BrettonWoods in-

stitution are,

therefore,
demanding from Nigeria a
credible Economic Restructuring Programme and a
commitrnent that the implementation would be

5

tcrnal debt pospects for the
rnedirrrn tcrm, ss migft ffrst
cmsider rrc pcsfuitity that the
prcscrrt critical d€bt sfhrafon
p€xrsists. Nigeria s 6t seivice
"

payment proftIe is currertly
estimated at an anrrual average of $5.O bilron or 46.8 per
cerrt of total annual orport
revenue, contrasting with an
average of about 2O per ceut for
all developing countries.
Clearly, this rate cannot be
sustained by the economy at
the current level of foreigp exchange earnings. In the
medium term, the situation
may beco[le even more pre-

tor.

19. The compounded debt
overhang under the above
urorst-case soenario, would re-

sult

in

unpleasant

oonsequenoes for the eonorr5r.

FlrsL Nigertas credlblty and
credit-worthiness migbt be
damaged- This uould lead to
reftrctian in lnflow of nenr tnvestment and espectally
dercfryrtffnane fu nds with
the result that marrlr vtable developrrwrt projects muld not
trc errccubd- the pr*lemuluild
rrct onty be a rnaju dsXrrcerrUrre b dtuectfqcipn irn esh€nL
itwould also d€rry N$erian importers short-term crdit lines
neededto keep production and
suppry ofgoods at acceptable
leryels. In effect' tmports might
need to be prepaid sqreral
months before delivery and serious supply shortages might
ensue. The lingering problem
of capital flight would worsen
leading to more speculative

in the foreign er<change market and the
practices

attendant continued deprecia-
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tion of the Nairawould further basis on the terms and condifuel the inllationary pres.sures tions of the agreement for each
category of loan. These, no
in the economy.
doubt, appear quite arduous
PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTTVE but they are not insurmountMANAGEIIENT OF MGERIA'S able.
EXTERI\IAL DEBT AND TIIE 21. In the light of Nlgerla's
present socio-economic cirPOLICY OPTIONS
20. Fortunately, however, cumstances, an effective
there are solutions to these external debt management
seemingly intractable problems strategr for the country in the
if only we took the necessaqy medium-term should include
iniUatives. This is becausejust the fotowing elements:
as there is a vicious cycie of 22. The first is that Nigeria
debt overhang, there is also a must embrace and implement
virtuous cycle for breaking out credible economic policy meaof it. One viable solution to sures in the medium-term
Nigeria's debt problem in the aimed
at
achieving
medium-term, is the success- macroeconomic stability, proful conclusion ofthe agreement moting transparency and
on the Medium-Term Economic
Restructuring Programme wi th
the IMF and the World Bank. Consistency in policy
This exercise would certainly uould restore tbe conftstart a process that could lead derrce of credltors and
to genuine debt and debt ser- enbance Nlgeda's cred.vice reduction. In addition, such
-u, ofi b I a step would induce a sustained fbilfry an d c re dlt
inflow of new capital througflr t ess. In tbis regard tbe
increased oport revenue, for- narket -b as e d ecoflornlc
eign direct investment and
mefusures betng
concessiond dwelgpment finance which would ensure that cutrerrtb, pursued rreed
the debt service obligations in to b e sustalned. to ensure
the medium-term do not go out tltet we are fiot lefi out tn
of step with the countqr's capacityto pay. Thereis no doubt tbe scltetne oJf tbtngs.
that the path to achieving an

appropriate and efficient accountability in
s trategr for mana glng Nigeria's

external debt would be rough.
For instance, it should be noted
that a track record of credible
performance is required of Nigeriabefore a cleanbill cfhealth
is given to the countr5,' as a
basis for negotiations on the

I

medium-term

the conlidence of foreign investors. The second elementofour

debt management strategic,
which is indeed a corollary of
the first, is the need for consistenry in our economic policies
and measures. Frequent shifts

credibility and credit-worthiness. In this regard, the
market-based economic policy
measures being currently pursued need to be sustained to
ensure that we are not left out
in the scheme of things.
23. The third element is to ensure political and social stability
in Nigeria. This is itself should
enable us Nigerians enjoy the
fruits of development efforts.
Also, the conducive environment would attract new inflow
of funds into the economy. Infl ow of foreign direct inves tment
and other autonomous funds
as well as concessionary loans
for development purposes can
be assured only in a stable
polity. In that connection, I wish
to stress that the successful
conclusion of Nigeria's poliUcal
transition programme would
usher in stable social/political
environment that should engender edonomic stability and
growth. Fourthly, as the eco-

nomlc

and

political

environment lmproves, our
abilityto expand the Debt Con-

verslon Programme will be
greatly enhanced. Since its inception in 1988, Nigeria's Debt
Conversion Programme has facilitated a modest reduction in
the country's debt stock and
debt service payment obligations. In addition, the linkage
effect has been felt in the areas
of domestic production, em-

ployment and exports. Its

continued use as a means of
further reducing external debt
obligations and to serve as a

economic in economic policyhave
catalyst for reviving the domescaused

prograrnme. In addition, Nigeria would need to negotiate at
the appropriate time with each
creditor country on one to one
6

economic
management and enhancing

would restore ttre confidence of
creditors and enhance Nigeria's

more problenrs for the economy
than those they initially sought
to address especially in the recent past. Consistency in policy

tic economy is highly desirable.

CONCLI'DING REMARTS

24. In concluding this address,
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I should like to make the point
that Nigeria's debt crisis could
have been avoided if loans were
properly contracted and de-

ployed to self-liquidating and
economically viable proJects.
Such project-Ued loans would
have generated goods and ser-

vices and future income
streams to amortise the loans.

25. A vtable external debt
management strategr would
encompass a number of ele-

ments including having

October/December 1995

reform/ deregulation thnrst and
put in place a credible Mediummade
not
imply
Tenn
Economic Programme as
above does
an
I
I advocacy for a debt cartel or well as the transition to civil
democratic polity. For the exI aeUt repudiailon; such a stratwould
unwise
be
and ternal creditors, tlrere is need
legy
i counterproducfive. However, for greater flodbility and more
the prwailirng massive tanglble concessions in terrns
lgr"*
ldebt stock and the huge debt of massive debt cancellation or
write-offto the o<tent of about
; service requiremerrts at a tlme
foretgn
the
country's
ex'
8@h, nrulti-year rescheduling
lwhen
as well as the provision of new
I change recelpts have cpntinued
to show only modestgrowth, tt money. The improving poU.cy
iis clear that the external debt and macroeconomic environiproblem would persist if not ment in Nlgerla, especlally with
deteriorate, with deferments the various irdUatives taken
I
lresulting in interest under tlle ausplces of the f 995
Budget, and the enhanced
I capitalisation, increased debt
prcpets
lncreased
stock,
debt
servlce
for economlc growth
I
lobligaUons and more defer- and theTtade expansion should
engender a more flerdble and
I ments, tn an un-endlngvlclous
rclrcle of debt. Thls situatlon supportrve stance by her er<tercalls for a new sense of reallsm nal creditors. If that happens,
of shared concernsr and re- the stage upuld have been set
sponsibtllUes between Ntgerla for a more vlable errternal debt
and her erfternal creditors. Orr management rqime.
I

t et me

stress for the avoidance

iof doubt that tl.e statement

external borrowtng guideltnes
to ensure orderliness; borrowing on concesslonal terms;
multi-year reschedultng; debt
and debt-serrrice reductlon; and
the lnllow of nerr mon€y.
26. In spite of the various
strategtes pursued by Nlgerla
to deal wlttr the external debt
problem, the debt overhang
perststs. The conclusion ts that
sornre,. or even a substantial
por&lon, of the debt are elther ,the part of Nigerla, there ls
I thank you
unpayable orwtll not be repaid. rneed to sustain the economtc Hnd attenUon.

all for your

EAILOF tt!gEs*-.'''i it€+
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